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Roger Scruton is wrong to suggest democracy is overrated. (Credit: Policy Exchange, cc by 2.0)
By Democratic Audit
A response to Roger Scruton: no, democracy is not overrated
In a recent article for the BBC’s ‘a Point of View’ series, the conservative Philosopher Roger Scruton argues
that democracy is overrated, and that we should value equal freedom and the protection of human rights
ahead of it. Philip Pettit of Princeton University argues that Scruton is wrong to distinguish between the three,
and that democracy is anything but overrated. 
In his piece, Roger Scruton
distinguishes democracy,
individual f reedom and the
protection of  human rights, on
the grounds that these are
‘three things, not one’. Using
that as his premise, he
suggests that democracy is
overrated and questions a
f oreign policy of  championing
democracy elsewhere. Why
should we champion
democracy, he asks, when
‘democracy is of ten a threat to
human rights and not a way of
protecting them’? He suggests
that it may be better to put
aside democracy and campaign
instead f or institutions such as
judicial independence, property
rights, f reedom of  speech and
legit imate opposition.
I agree with Scruton on the importance of  these institutions. But I disagree strongly with the idea that the
promotion of  the institutions is separable f rom the promotion of  democracy. First, there is no hope of
promoting democracy without promoting such institutions. And, second, there is no prospect of  securing
such institutions without securing democracy. They are doubly associated.
Scruton equates democracy with popularly elected government. But on even the most minimal
characterization of  electoral democracy, such as that which Joseph Schumpeter popularized amongst
polit ical scientists in the 1940’s, it requires a system of  election that is open, competit ive and periodic,
enf ranchising all cit izens that count by reasonable standards as qualif ied. No such system of  election
could operate properly without ensuring most of  the institutions that Scruton rightly commends.
To be open the system would have to give individuals the f reedom and right to state their views, stand f or
of f ice and associate with one another in electoral campaigns. To be competit ive it would have to make
room f or a right of  legit imate opposition on the part of  the def eated who hope to f ight another day. To be
periodic, it would have to enable the opposition and the people generally to assert a right against
government’s continuing beyond a pre-set period in power. And to ensure rights in these three areas, the
system would have to establish a mode of  appointment or dismissal f or the judiciary — the agency that
gives substance to rights — that allows them independence f rom the government of  the day.
What of  property rights, a f ourth institution that Scruton supports? Not to recognize property rights, the
system would have to give elected government the discretion, depending on what is in its electoral interest,
to reallocate property as it wishes: in a word, to neglect the rule of  law in matters of  ownership. But this
would be a recipe f or democratic disaster. No democratic electoral system could survive in the turmoil and
chaos that such arbitrary government would introduce.
Scruton might possibly agree that to promote democracy, even democracy understood in a purely electoral
sense, requires promoting those other institutions: that they are inseparable in that direction. Perhaps his
only claim is that they are separable in the other direction: that in many circumstances we can and should
promote those other institutions without sponsoring f ull-scale democracy. But I disagree also with this.
In order to enjoy property rights or the rights associated with judicial independence, f reedom of  speech and
legit imate opposition, it is not enough to have the good f ortune of  enjoying the exercise of  those rights.
You must be able to exercise those rights, not as a matter of  f ortune or f avor, but on an objectively and
subjectively secure basis. You do not enjoy f reedom of  speech, f or example, when the government lets you
speak your piece as a token of  goodwill: a concession or indulgence. You must have the license to speak
as a matter of  protected right that you can assert against government.
How could the rights required f or these institutions be secure except in the presence of  a democratic
system that is truly open, competit ive and periodic? Only such a system could ever give people the robust
standing in relation to government that would establish such rights. Only such a system would enable
individuals to stand on their own two f eet, look the powerf ul in the eye and assert the claims they have to
oppose the government, express what opinions they will, hold their property and look f or their day in an
independent court. There is no right without a secure right — no right without a power to assert it — and
only the democratic control of  government could secure the rights associated with judicial independence,
f reedom of  speech, opposition to government and indeed ownership.
Scruton speaks of  his f riends in eastern Europe who looked in the 1980’s f or the sorts of  rights that he
would priorit ize over democracy. But those activists would not have been happy to be returned to the days
of  government goodwill associated, f or example, with the Prague Spring of  1968. While the Dubcek
government and its Soviet masters of f ered people an increased enjoyment of  f ree speech and opposition
in those days, they did not establish rights of  f ree speech and opposition. It was always clear, even bef ore
the collapse of  August 1968, that since the powers that be could always withdraw the privileges of f ered,
particularly if  they weren’t pleased with their exercise, those privileges never amounted to rights.
Just as there is no democracy without other institutions, then — no democracy without f ree speech,
legit imate opposition, judicial independence and property rights — so it is impossible to have such
institutions in any proper sense without democracy. The inseparability runs both ways.
The maintain this inseparability thesis is not to deny, of  course, that when it comes to dealing with a non-
democratic government, it may be good policy to put aside democratic recommendations as inf easible and
concentrate on what is more prof itably pursued. And it is not to deny that the most prof itable overture in
some cases will be to advocate that the government should grant people the rights — albeit, they can only
amount to privileges — of  judicial independence, legit imate opposition, f reedom of  speech and private
property. But the pragmatic sense of  such a policy should not lead us to think that democracy is as
separable f rom proper rights in these areas as Scruton’s piece suggests that they may be.
At the beginning of  this discussion, I said that Scruton associates democracy primarily with electoral
government. I certainly think that the ideal of  democracy requires an open, competit ive, periodic system of
election but in conclusion I would like to explain why I am unhappy about equating the two.
In my recent book, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of  Democracy (CUP 2012), I
argue f or a view of  democracy that is based on the republican premise that f reedom is a paramount value
and that f reedom in any domain of  choice requires security and protection against interf erence, not just the
f ortuity of  avoiding it; f reedom requires non-domination, not just non- interf erence. While law is needed to
identif y and protect the sphere in which each can enjoy such security, I hold that in order to avoid being
itself  dominating, government must be subject to a f orm of  control that is equally shared amongst its
people. And, in line with this argument, I equate democracy with the republican ideal in which the people or
demos enjoy equally shared control or kratos over government.
While such equally shared control requires an open, competit ive, periodic system of  election, it requires
much else besides. My f irst pref erence would have been to argue f or the connection between an electoral
system and the sorts of  institutions cited by Scruton on the grounds that they all play important, interacting
roles in the network of  institutions needed to support democracy in that rich, republican sense. But I hope
that the connection is palpable, even when we start with the austere equation between democracy and
popular election.
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